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Abstract
This paper examines the trade-oﬀ between resource intensive development and preservation
of natural resources in the context of groundwater. Use of public schemes that expand ground-
water irrigation to mitigate poverty is challenged as being unsustainable, especially when water
tables around the world are rapidly depleting. This paper evaluates the eﬀects one such scheme
on groundwater use in northern India with the intent to determine if these schemes accelerate
water depletion. On the contrary, I ﬁnd that the program decreased total use of groundwater.
I propose a mechanism that explains these ﬁndings, and test it using village-level longitudinal
census data on wells and aquifer depth. The model predicts that public provision has a hetero-
geneous impact on the aquifers and it leads to sustainable use, when the ﬁxed costs for private
well provision are high. Consistent with the predictions, I ﬁnd that there is a signiﬁcant jump
in the water-saving eﬀects of the scheme at the water table depth at which the ﬁxed costs of
water provision rise substantially due to the technological limitations of surface pumps.
JEL Classiﬁcations: H54, O12, O13, Q01, Q25, Q561 Introduction
A fundamental challenge to resource intensive development initiatives is that these are argued to
be unsustainable. Poverty reduction through channels of increasing access to scarce resources and
protecting those resources seem to be contradictory objectives. This paper addresses the question
of whether it is possible to pursue and promote these two goals at the same time in the context of
groundwater in rural India.
Groundwater irrigation has been instrumental in enhancing food security and mitigating poverty
in developing countries. Groundwater provides timely irrigation leading to an increase in crop
intensity and productivity (FAO, 2003). But groundwater irrigation also contributes the most
to the depletion of groundwater reserves. Countries with signiﬁcant groundwater irrigated areas,
including Mexico, United States, Yemen, Pakistan, India, and China are experiencing substantial
declines in their water tables due to over-exploitation of groundwater reserves.1
This paper examines the economic underpinnings of the trade oﬀ between increasing access and
sustaining reserves of groundwater in India. Rural India is a very pertinent and important setting
to study how resource intensive development schemes aﬀect the stock of resources particularly
groundwater. As in many other countries, water tables in India are declining. Fifteen percent of
the administrative blocks in India are considered overexploited2 (CGWB, 2004), and this number
is growing at an alarming rate of 5.5 percent per annum. At the same time, increasing groundwater
access for large numbers of marginal and small land holdings is a priority for policy makers.3Almost
62 percent of the land holdings in India are smaller than 1 hectare. Since the ﬁxed costs required to
sink a well in order to access groundwater are very high, poor farmers ﬁnd it challenging to access
groundwater for irrigation.
One measure adopted to enhance access to groundwater resources is public provision of ground-
water for irrigation by installing large capacity wells in rural areas. A priori, one would expect that
1 Collectively, annual ground water depletion in India, China, the United States, North Africa and the Arabian
Peninsula totals 160 billion cubic meters a year - an amount roughly double the total annual ﬂow of the River Nile
(UNFPA, 2003).
2Blocks are considered overexploited if more groundwater is extracted than is replenished.
3This concern over the environment development trade-oﬀ is vividly expressed by policy makers as reﬂected in
the remarks of Mrs. Indira Gandhi the prime minster of India in early 1980s, “We do not wish to impoverish the
environment any further, and yet we cannot for a moment forget the grim poverty of large numbers of people...How
can we speak to those who live in villages and slums about keeping the oceans and rivers and air clean when their
own lives are contaminated at source? The environment cannot be improved in conditions of poverty.”
1public provision would exacerbate the decline of already falling water tables by enhancing access
to those farmers who could otherwise not aﬀord wells. Since irrigation would expand to previously
un-irrigated farms, overall groundwater use would increase. However, the evidence from a public
provision program in northern India suggests that in fact public provision can lead to conservation
of the resource.
In this paper, I propose an explanation for this ﬁnding. Introducing public provision of ground-
water has two eﬀects on water table depth. First, as noted, it tends to increase irrigation among
farmers who otherwise would not sink a well. This extensive margin eﬀect would increase water
usage and have a negative impact on water tables. But since public provision is a substitute for
privately extracted water and the ﬁxed cost required to sink a well is very high, public provision
may forestall installation of some private wells. This second intensive margin eﬀect can lead to a
lower water usage if the price charged is higher than the marginal cost of private water extraction.
Such a ‘crowding out’ of private wells accompanied with a reduction in water usage on the intensive
margin can oﬀset the negative impact of increased irrigation and lead to overall conservation of
groundwater. Although applied to the case of groundwater provision, this theory is more general-
izable. It is applicable to other situations where the ﬁxed costs of private provision are relatively
high and public provision can be used to improve access.4
In the context of groundwater, I model the choice faced by farmers between sinking their own
wells, using publicly provided water, or farming without groundwater irrigation. The analysis of
this choice delivers the conditions under which public provision of groundwater leads to reduction
in groundwater use. The model shows that while public provision increases access for small sized
farmers, larger farmers decrease their overall usage. In the model, the depth of the water table
plays a key role in determining the balance between the intensive and extensive margin eﬀects.
Because the ﬁxed cost is relatively low at shallow depths, a large fraction of farmers own wells.
Therefore the negative eﬀect arising from the extensive margin is small. Also, due to low ﬁxed
costs, very few farmers are dissuaded from sinking their own wells. Hence, the intensive margin
is small as well. In such a scenario, the two opposing eﬀects cancel each other and there is little
change in water usage. But as depth, and hence the ﬁxed cost increases, more farmers choose to
use public wells instead of sinking their own wells. Therefore, it is more likely that the positive
4An example is the use of automobiles versus light rail or subways in developing countries. A metro system has
recently become operational in New Delhi which might help with the automobile congestion and pollution issues in
the city as the intensive margin users switch to using the metro system rather than investing in cars.
2intensive margin eﬀect dominates. As long as there is a suﬃcient number of these larger farmers
who forgo sinking their own wells, the positive eﬀect on aquifers on account of the intensive margin
can oﬀset the negative extensive margin eﬀect. In sum, the key prediction is that when the ﬁxed
cost is high but not prohibitive, these schemes can beneﬁt the local water tables.5 In addition to
this key prediction, the model also predicts that the number of private wells given public provision
falls as the ﬁxed cost required to access groundwater rises.
I evaluate these predictions using detailed village-level longitudinal data on wells and water
tables from the Minor Irrigation Census of India. In the empirical analysis, I exploit the fact that
a low cost surface pump becomes infeasible to lift water from below a depth of around 25 feet. If
the depth of the water table exceeds this cutoﬀ, then the farmers are precluded from using the low
cost surface pumps. In that case, they need to employ more sophisticated and consequently more
expensive pumps. So the ﬁxed cost of accessing the groundwater has a discrete jump at 25 feet.
Taking advantage of this discrete jump in ﬁxed cost, I divide the villages into high and low cost
categories depending on the depth of water table in the initial period. From this, I am able to
isolate the eﬀect of public provision of groundwater on local water tables by varying degree of cost
required to access the resource.
The source of variation in public provision that I exploit is an expansion in public tube wells
under a program that was initiated in 8 districts of eastern parts of the state of Uttar Pradesh with
the intent of reducing poverty. I use triple diﬀerences - across time, across treated and comparison
villages, and across categories of cost - to isolate the eﬀect of public provision of groundwater on
local water tables in high ﬁxed cost category relative to low ﬁxed cost category. Villages were not
randomly selected into the program. I perform a number of tests that make a compelling case that
the results are not confounded by selection bias.
The main ﬁnding is that public provision schemes can lead to sustainable water use in areas
with high ﬁxed costs of private well provision and it happens on account of crowding out of private
wells. My results show that water tables in the treated villages where the initial depth precluded
the use of low cost pumps fell less than in comparison villages. However, no diﬀerence was detected
5In developing countries, due to large fraction of small holdings, the well density is very high. Wells are generally
clustered at the level of villages and the eﬀects they have on water tables in the village are localized spatially.
Moreover, the lateral ﬂow velocity of groundwater is not high enough for the water to ﬂow across large areas in short
spans of time. Depending on the medium, lateral ﬂow velocities of 2 centimeters per year are considered normal
(Todd, 1980). Therefore, local eﬀects on village water tables are analyzed in spite of the interconnected nature of the
aquifer.
3between treated and comparison among low cost villages. Consistent with the predictions of the
model, the expansion in the number of private wells per village reduced in the high cost treated
villages relative to comparison villages, whereas there was no change in treated versus comparison
among low ﬁxed cost villages. From policy perspective, the results suggest that well designed public
provision schemes can be used to further access in a sustainable way.
While groundwater management in developing countries has become a pressing global policy
concern, it has received very limited attention from economists.6 Most of the existing research
in developing countries explores local groundwater markets. Jacoby et al. (2004) address market
power and eﬃciency issues related to rural groundwater markets. Anderson (2006) contends that
ethnic barriers along caste dimensions can impede these markets, which results in low agricultural
productivity of low-caste farmers in high-caste dominated villages. Foster and Sekhri (2007) study
where and how these markets emerge, and how does the development of these markets impact
the water tables. Foster and Rosenzweig (2008) investigate the interaction of land inequality and
groundwater usage, and ﬁnd that there is a concave relationship between land inequality and
groundwater depletion. None of these studies focus on public provision and sustainable use of
groundwater.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the background and context. Section 3
presents the theoretical framework. Section 4 describes the data that I use in the empirical analysis.
Section 5 discusses the kind of water pumps used in irrigation and associated ﬁxed costs. Section
6 contains the estimation strategy, and Section 7 the results. I conclude by performing robustness
checks to address selection in section 8 and discussing caveats and extensions in Section 9.
2 Background and Context
Groundwater sustains about sixty percent of India’s agriculture. The high yielding varieties(HYV)
of crops that ushered in the ‘Green Revolution’ in India are very sensitive to the timing and level of
6Groundwater Management has been studied extensively in the developed country context especially in United
States (Brill and Burness, 1994; Gisser and Sanchez, 1980). Most of these studies examine the common pool externality
associated with groundwater irrigation and the role of water policies in addressing them. However, groundwater
management in a developing country context warrants an alternative analysis. Majority of the farmers tend to be
very small and poor. Most of the farms in India for example are smaller than 1 hectare. As a result, water policies
have been designed to further development goals. Evidence of signiﬁcant depletion of the resource is now bringing a
shift in policies towards sustaining the groundwater reserves. But at the same time, increasing access remains a high
priority for public policy.
4irrigation. Groundwater irrigation has increased more rapidly than other sources of irrigation such
as tanks and canals and is called ‘water by demand’ as it is readily available in times of moisture
stress. Irrigated agriculture was dominated by gravity systems until the 1970s but the next two
decades saw a rapid acceleration in groundwater use. By late 1990s, groundwater irrigation had
become the major source of irrigation in India [Figure 1]. HYV crops require timely, reliable and
adequate water supply and using groundwater for irrigation gives farmers the control to meet such
needs. Farmers with access to groundwater are able to water their crops in crucial stages of growth.
They are also able to meet the water needs of rabi, or summer crops, without having to rely on
good monsoon rainfall.
As a result, there has been a substantial private investment in wells in recent decades. According
to one estimate, the number of wells has increased from less than 1 million in 1960 to more than 19
million in 2000 (IWMI, 2002). This phenomenal increase in access to groundwater has mitigated
poverty, enhanced food security and increased rural population growth. In 1965-66, rainfall was 20
percent below normal and food production fell by 19 percent.7 In contrast, in 1987-88, rainfall was
18 percent below normal but food production only declined by 2 percent (GOI and World Bank,
1998). Research at the Indian Council of Agricultural Research has attributed this change to the
increased access to groundwater. In addition, groundwater now supplies 80 percent of domestic
use water in rural India. The downside to this pattern of development is that groundwater is not
sustainable if more water is extracted than is recharged through rainfall and snow melt. Various
parts of the country are already experiencing declines in water tables.
Groundwater irrigation development has largely been a private initiative. The government has
facilitated the development of groundwater irrigation by providing subsidies for pump sets and
energy. In addition, there is also institutional credit support in the form of loans from the banking
industry. However, due to the high ﬁxed cost associated with the technology, poor and marginal
farmers cannot aﬀord to invest. Postel (1999) reports that the ﬁxed cost in some parts of India is
as high as $2,950. Therefore, small farmers would not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to invest in well technology.
Also, lands in some regions are so fragmented that farmers cannot invest in a pump on each parcel
of their holdings (Shah, 1993). The government has attempted to increase access by sinking large
capacity wells in rural areas and making water available for irrigation. Between 1968-69 to 1984-85,
there was a three-fold rise in public wells in the three poorest Indian states.
7In eastern plains of India, where the study districts are located, the decline was 33 percent.
52.1 Public Tube Wells in Uttar Pradesh
Uttar Pradesh has the highest number of public tube wells in the country. It is a very pertinent
setting to evaluate how public provision might aﬀect groundwater resources. It is the the most
populous state of India, with a population density that is double the national average. The state is
also one of the poorest in the country. The eastern part of the state, where the program districts are
located, is poorer than the western part. Agriculture relies heavily on groundwater for irrigation8,
and is characterized by a very large share of marginal holdings (less than 1 hectare). The trends
indicate that water tables are falling rapidly. Over the ten years from May 1988 to May 1997,
68 percent of the 989 observation wells showed a declining trend in mean water tables (CGWB,
1997-98).
Since the setup costs for the deep public wells are very high and their discharge capacity can serve
several irrigators, the state government has often sought ﬁnancial partnership with international
donors in establishing these wells. International aid agencies and donors have actively targeted
construction of public tube wells in Uttar Pradesh with the aim of helping the resource poor
marginal farmers in raising their standard of living.
In 1988, the Indo-Dutch tube well project was started in 8 districts of eastern Uttar Pradesh.
It involved construction of 750 new tube wells, and rehabilitation of 325 old wells. At the time of
completion in 1993, 80 percent wells were put into operation (Alberts, 1998). The expansion in
public tube wells that occurred on account of this program is used as the source of variation in
public provision in the analysis that follows. The project was modeled after the World Bank 1983
public tube well expansion scheme. These programs were concentrated on the construction of deep
tube wells that have a command area of about 100 hectares (Cunningham, 1992). Like the World
Bank program, the wells in this program had underground distribution channels and independent
electrical connections from the power substations. These features made the wells more eﬃcient than
their precursors which used traditional ﬁeld channels for distribution and rural electricity supply
for energy, but at the same time the total cost of providing the wells increased.
3 Conceptual Framework
To assess the impact of the introduction of public provision on groundwater, I develop a model
that relates the aquifer depth to the ﬁxed cost of groundwater extraction. The model examines
8In 2000-01, 80 percent of the total irrigation was on account of groundwater.
6the well sinking choice of farmers in the absence and presence of public provision for groundwater
in areas with signiﬁcant variation in land holdings. The model establishes that when ﬁxed costs
relative to marginal costs are very high, public provision crowds out private investment in wells
by relatively larger farmers. The choice between sinking and not sinking own well inﬂuences the
overall usage of water, and hence the average eﬀect on water table depth, which is the subject
of study in the empirical analysis. The conditions that would lead to overall conservation of the
resource are formulated for a Pareto distribution of land.
Fixed costs are a very high percentage of the total cost9 of sinking and operating wells and
the scale of operation determines the viability of investment in private wells. The theoretical
model developed in this section incorporates the lumpy nature of investment required to access
groundwater.
3.1 Model Setup
Consider a micro watershed10 with N farmers. The water table is located at depth d below ground
level. If a farmer sinks a well of depth δ and extracts water W, he incurs the ﬁxed cost of installing
a well, variable cost that depends on how deep a well he sinks and the cost of water extraction.
A key aspect of the problem is the relationship between well depth and maximum water ﬂow rate
that can be achieved. In mathematical hydrology, Theim ’s equilibrium condition provides this
relationship:









where d is the depth of the aquifer at reference distance R from the center of the well, r is the radius
of the well, κ is a constant characterizing soil porosity, and W is the amount of water extracted.
The cost of installing a well of capacity W gross of water extraction cost includes an annualized
ﬁxed cost p0 and an annualized variable cost p1 incurred per unit of depth δ. This is expressed as :
C = p0 + p1δ (2)
Since equation 1 describes the relation between depth of the well δ and water extracted W,
9According to a World bank study(World Bank, 2001) the share of ﬁxed cost in total cost of sinking and operating
a well is around 60 to 80 percent irrespective of the size of the farmers and is particularly high among smaller farmers.
10A micro-watershed is a coherent ecosystem at the smallest viable geographical area. It is administratively as well
as operationally the most meaningful planning unit (Shukla, 1992).
7total cost11 can be expressed as:
C = c(d) + tW (3)
Intuitively, in shallow aquifers12, digging costs are lower and we can use simpler pumping technology.
As the aquifers get deeper, more sophisticated technologies like submersible pumps are required
to access the aquifer and the sinking costs rise. Therefore, the ﬁxed cost of sinking a well is an
increasing function of d, the depth of water table below ground level.
The farm production function uses water as the only variable input and the productivity of per
unit land is determined by water employed per unit land. The price of output is normalized to 1.
The production process is assumed to be Cobb Douglas.13 When a farmer does not irrigate using
his own well, his proﬁts are assumed to be 0. The proﬁt when the farmer with plot size a sinks his




)α − c(d) − tW (4)
The farmer decides how much groundwater to pump conditional on sinking a well. His water







Demand for water is, not surprisingly, increasing in farm area and technology parameter θ and











α−1 − c(d) (6)
Because proﬁt from not sinking one’s own well is 0, a farmer will choose to sink a well if
Π∗
0(W∗











α−1 − dc(d) > 0
11 I assume that water can be extracted costlessly. Because the incremental energy costs to lift water relative to
ﬁxed costs are very low, this assumption does not change the qualitative results of the model, although it makes the
analysis more tractable. In the case of electric pumps, due to a ﬂat tariﬀ policy, this would be like a proportional
tax on farmers and would not aﬀect comparative statics.
12In shallow aquifers, the depth at which water table is reached is closer to ground level
13A general functional form gives the same qualitative implications for analyzing the choice that farmers make
about sinking wells or using public water, but the parametric assumption is made to determine analytically the water
saving eﬀect of the program.
8Government Provision
Now suppose that groundwater for irrigation is extracted by the government from a single source
well and publicly provided at a price p > t 14
If the farmer chooses to sink his own well, then the proﬁt is the same as before and is given
by (6). On the other hand if the farmer does not sink his well, he does not incur the ﬁxed cost
and variable cost for a particular well depth. His only expense is the price he pays to procure
groundwater. So, proﬁt from publicly provided irrigation water is:
ΠP = θa1−αWα − pW (7)







Maximum proﬁt from using water W = W∗
P is increasing in farm area and decreasing in aquifer

















Based on these choice rules, there are two scales of land equal to (i) a∗
NP and (ii) a∗
p such that
only farmers with bigger holdings will sink a well when (i) no public groundwater is available and
(ii) when public water is available. As the depth of the aquifer increases, the scales above which it
is proﬁtable to sink a well increase too because the ﬁxed cost of well installation goes up. Finally,
the minimum scale above which a farmer sinks his own well is higher when public water is available
than when it is not available. So, the public water in essence crowds out private investment over
the range a∗
P − a∗
NP. The range of crowding out increases as depth increases 15.
14 Water Prices were set by the UP government such that they varied by season. Evidence suggests that a part of
the cost of improved distribution infrastructure was passed on to the users through groundwater price (IFAD, 1983).
The cost of water at the farm under previous public well programs that used traditional methods for distribution
of water was higher. Shah(1993) reports that these public tube-well schemes charged a higher price than the price
being charged in groundwater sharing arrangements among neighboring farmers. Also, in the empirical analysis, I
ﬁnd that the villages with public provision where ﬁxed cost to access the water table is high experience less rapid
expansion in groundwater irrigated area relative to comparison villages indicating a decline in use of groundwater.
This would not be consistent with a situation in which t exceeds p.
15Proof is available on request
9The evaluation of the eﬀects of the program on water usage, and thus aquifer depletion, requires
an assessment of how a farmer’s behavior changes with his land area and an aggregation of this over
the entire distribution of land. Overall diﬀerential water usage under public provision is examined
to determine the conditions that lead to conservation of groundwater.
Water Usage
When publicly provided groundwater is available, water usage increases on account of increase in
irrigated area of the farmers who are too small to sink a well, which is the extensive margin eﬀect.
But since ﬁxed costs are high, there is also an intensive margin water saving eﬀect that accrues
because larger farmers substitute towards using publicly provided groundwater. These farmers
would have sunk a well if public provision was not available. The price that these farmers pay
under public provision is higher than the marginal cost of private extraction, so their net usage
would reduce. Since demand for groundwater is increasing in farm area and the farmers in the
intensive margin are larger than those in the extensive margin, the reduction in their total water
usage can oﬀset the increase in water usage of the smaller farmers in the extensive margin.
In a regime when both extensive and intensive margins operate(i.e. a∗
P > a∗
NP > am, where am
is the minimum holding size), the diﬀerence in water usage when the publicly provided groundwater














The ﬁrst term is the increase in water usage that results from the extensive margin, while
the second term in (10) captures the intensive margin eﬀect. Since price charged exceeds private
marginal costs, this term is negative. The net eﬀect on aquifers will depend on whether the inten-
sive margin eﬀect outweighs the extensive margin eﬀect or not.
To fully characterize the conditions under which net savings of water occur, we need to assume a
distribution for land. It is conventional to parameterize the land distribution as Pareto distribution
since it is considered to approximate land distributions very well.16The density function is given
by:
16I ﬁt a Pareto density to the land distribution at village level using a data-set that is representative of the region






where µ is the Pareto Index that governs how thick the tail of the distribution is. For low values,
the tail is thick implying more wealthy farmers in the distribution.
We can then identify the conditions under which the intensive margin eﬀect would dominate
and we would observe net water savings.
Proposition 1 For a micro watershed with land distribution represented by Pareto density where
am is the minimum land holding size and µ is the Pareto Index, the diﬀerential water usage under
public provision of groundwater for irrigation, 4W can be characterized as follows:
(1) If am > a∗
P > a∗
NP , 4W = 0
(2) If a∗
NP < am < a∗
P , 4W < 0
(3) If am < a∗
NP < a∗
P , ∃ a ρ(
p
t) and a d∗(am,θ,µ,
p
t,α) > 0 such that whenever
(i) µ < 1 − ρ, 4W < 0
(ii) µ ≥ 1 − ρ, 4W < 0 for d < d∗(am,θ,µ,
p
t,α)and 4W > 0 for d > d∗(am,θ,µ,
p
t,α)
The Proof can be found in the Mathematical Appendix .
The proposition can be understood in terms of Figure 2. Part (1) arises when the water table
depth is small. In this case, we are in regime A such that am exceeds both a∗
P and a∗
NP. This
implies that ﬁxed costs are so small that all farmers prefer to sink their own wells even when public
provision is available. In such a scenario, neither the intensive margin, nor the extensive margin
exist. So when public provision is available, there is no change in water usage. At greater depth in
regime B, am exceeds a∗
NP, so all farmers sink wells in absence of public provision, hence there is
no extensive margin eﬀect. However, am is less than a∗
P reﬂecting the fact that drilling cost is high
enough so that some farmers do not sink their own wells. This intensive margin eﬀect is negative,
therefore the overall water usage is negative. In regime C, where the water table depth increases
further, am is less than both a∗
P and a∗
NP. So, both extensive and intensive margin eﬀects operate.
The extensive margin eﬀect results in increased water usage whereas the intensive margin eﬀect
11oﬀsets this. At suﬃciently high depths, a∗
NP −am becomes large so the extensive margin is bigger,
although the farm size of farmers is relatively small. If the Pareto density is such that it has a thick
tail, then even at very large depths, there will be large sized farmers who would be precluded from
sinking their own wells given public provision. In this case, the intensive margin will dominate
and the net eﬀect will result in negative water usage. On the other hand, if there are not enough
large sized farmers, then the extensive margin will outweigh the intensive margin and there will be
increased water usage.
4 Data
The empirical analysis uses detailed panel data on village water table depth, geology,
shallow and deep wells, and demographic and economic characteristics of the villages17. The main
source of data are 2 rounds (1993 and 2000) of the Minor Irrigation Census (MI census) conducted
by the Government of India on a quinquennial basis. This census accounts for the entire population
of wells, and I make use of a data set for 30 districts in north eastern plains of India. The Wells data
account for around 1.2 million wells and have comprehensive information including details about
ownership, holding size of farmers for privately owned wells, sources of ﬁnance, energy source of the
pumps, and average pumping hours, among other things. In addition, information about village
level average depth of the water table, ground water irrigated area, sown area and cultivated area
are contained in the Village data.
I matched this data set across two time periods to form a panel for the villages. This was further
matched to the Primary Census Abstract and the Village Directories of the Population Census of
India for years 1991 and 2001. The demographic characteristics are available in the Primary Census
Abstract and the village level infrastructure details including availability of surface irrigation and
power are in the Village Directory of the Population Census. The geological data (elevation, slope
and solar radiation) were obtained by using the Digital Elevation Model SRTM at 1 km resolution18
for the relevant area in India and the spatial locations of these villages. Finally, the spatial data was
17The unit of analysis is the village. The village level water tables are considered to be micro aquifers that are
aﬀected by highly localized anthropogenic interventions. Village is the smallest unit of administration at which
government initiatives in public goods are implemented. In fact, natural resource planners at ISRO do consider
village as the micro unit of planning and village level aquifers are referred to as micro-watersheds.
18Source for this data was the Global Land Cover Facility, www.landcover.org
12matched to the University of East Anglia Climatic Research Unit (CRU) Global 0.5 deg Monthly
Time Series, Version 2.1 to get average annual rainfall and temperature details. The public
tube well sites were selected in 1988-1990. I use the Census of India 1991 data to proxy for the
demographic and infrastructure conditions at the time of selection given the absence of any other
source of such information for these years.
Table A1 provides summary statistics for the main variables. The Data Appendix summarizes
the data sources, the variable deﬁnitions, and the constructed samples. The main sample used
has 7667 villages in all with 426289 shallow tube wells in year 2000. As a preliminary exploration,
Figure 3 plots the predicted diﬀerence in the impact of public provision of groundwater for irrigation
on changes in water table depth by initial depth. This graph indicates that the diﬀerence in water
table depth change across treated villages relative to comparison villages is negative (which implies
positive eﬀect on aquifers) and this diﬀerence increases as initial depth increases.
5 Irrigation Pumps and The Fixed Cost of Investment
In this section, I describe the kind of pumps used in irrigation, highlight the diﬀerences in their
ﬁxed costs and establish that there is a critical value of water table depth at which the cheaper and
low maintenance pumps are rendered infeasible. Several kinds of pumps can be used to draw water
from a tube well. Irrigation Pumps vary along the dimensions of cost and vertical lift provided.
Most commonly used pumps in irrigation are volute centrifugal pumps (Raghunath, 1982, p.363).
These surface pumps create low pressure in the tube well so the atmospheric pressure pushing down
on water outside the well causes the water level in the well to rise. This suction process continues
till there is no pressure diﬀerence inside and outside the tube well19. If a perfect vacuum could
be created, the water would rise to a height of 34 feet as the weight of the column of this height
exerts pressure equal to atmospheric pressure. However, since perfect vacuum cannot be created,
the accepted practical standard for vertical lift using these pumps is 25 feet (Gibson and Singer,
1969, p.116).
This means that if the water table20 is beyond 25 feet below the ground level, then suction lift
based surface pumps cannot be used to lift water. In that case, submersible pumps that are placed
inside the well tube are used in lifting water (Gibson and Singer, 1969, p.116 &124). There is a
signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the ﬁxed cost of these pumps. The submersible pumps cost 3 times as much
19Pressure inside the well is due to the weight of the water in the tube and outside the well is due to the atmosphere.
20 Water table is deﬁned as the depth below ground level at which water is at atmospheric pressure
13as centrifugal pumps that operate on the ground surface and the total installation of the deep wells
costs about 4.5 times more than the shallow wells (Raghunath, 1982,Table E3 and E4,p.446-447).
6 Estimation Strategy
The model demonstrates that the impact of public provision of groundwater on the water table may
vary by ﬁxed costs required to sink a well. Hence, I want to isolate the eﬀect of public provision of
groundwater on the treated villages (i.e. average treatment eﬀect on the treated) by varying degree
of ﬁxed cost required to access groundwater.
For evaluating the eﬀect on the treated villages by varying degree of ﬁxed cost, I exploit the fact
that cheaper surface pumps with suction technology can only be used if the vertical distance that
the water has to be lifted from below the surface of earth is less than 25 feet. This allows me to
characterize villages by initial depth of water table as either being low cost or high cost depending
on whether or not the cheaper surface pumps can be used. I can then implement diﬀerences-in-
diﬀerences by categories of cost.Another major concern in identifying the eﬀect of public provision
of groundwater on water table depth is that the selection of villages for the deep public well program
might have been based on village characteristics that may be correlated with water table depth.
For example,since soil properties are an important determinant of water table depth, if the villages
where soil is very permeable were targeted for the public tube well program, water table depth and
selection into the program could be jointly determined by soil properties. In such a scenario, we
would not be able to isolate the eﬀect of public provision of groundwater on water table depth. In
order to address this issue, I use a triple diﬀerence approach.
The identiﬁcation strategy relies on the fact that the deep public tube well program generates
variation in exposure to public provision of groundwater across region and time. Within each ﬁxed
cost category, by comparing the water table depth within villages at the time when the public
wells were put into operation and afterwards, I diﬀerence out the unobserved time invariant village
characteristics which may aﬀect water table depth. Comparing treated villages to comparison
villages within each category of cost diﬀerences out changes that are not due to exposure to public
provision of groundwater. I then evaluate the diﬀerences across cost categories to isolate the
estimate for the eﬀect of public provision of groundwater for irrigation on high cost category
relative to low cost category. The distribution of the depth of the water tables in the initial
14period for the treated and comparison villages overlaps irrespective of the cost categories21. Hence,
the average treatment eﬀect on the treated can be estimated consistently. The key identifying
assumption is that in absence of exposure to public provision of groundwater, secular trends in
depth of groundwater in treated and comparison villages would not vary in villages associated with
high ﬁxed cost relative to those associated with low ﬁxed cost. In other words, this strategy breaks
down only if there are changes over time that vary across treated and comparison villages and these
diﬀerential trends are systematically diﬀerent across the two cost categories.
This triple diﬀerence model can be speciﬁed as follows:
Let yb
it,b ∈ [L,H] be the the average outcome of village i in period t and cost category b. Then,
conditional on time varying observed characteristics of the village, yb
it,b ∈ [L,H] can be written as
follows:
For low cost category,
yL
it = αL + βL ∗ post + γL ∗ Ti + δ ∗ Ti ∗ Post + εit (12)
For high cost category,
yH
it = αH + βH ∗ post + γH ∗ Ti + (δ + η) ∗ Ti ∗ Post + εit (13)
where post is an indicator variable that equals one if the year of measurement is the post treatment
year and 0 otherwise, Ti is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the village i is treated and 0
otherwise.The standard errors are clustered at the village level to allow for an arbitrary covariance
structure across time.
Upon diﬀerencing these, I isolate η which is the parameter of interest.




αb ∗ Ib +
X
b
βb ∗ (Ib ∗ post) +
X
b
γb ∗ (Ib ∗ Ti) +
X
b
δb ∗ (Ib ∗ Ti ∗ Post) + εit (14)
where Ib are indicator variables such that IL equals 1 if the village falls in the low cost category
and 0 otherwise and IH equals 1 if the village falls in the high cost zone and 0 otherwise. The
parameter of interest is then calculated as: η = δL − δH
This diﬀerence measures the eﬀect of public provision of groundwater in high cost villages relative
to low cost villages.
21The ﬁgure that plots these distributions is available on request
157 Results
7.1 Results on Water Table Depth
The estimation results of (14) are reported in Panel A, Column(i) 22 of Table 1. I ﬁnd that the
public provision of groundwater is associated with a 5.15 m less decline of water table depth in the
high cost category whereas it has no eﬀect on water tables in low cost category. Panel B reports
the diﬀerence in impact across cost categories. The high cost category villages experienced less
decline in the water table depth relative to low cost category villages. The F statistic that tests for
a signiﬁcant diﬀerence across cost categories is 3.85 and the diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant at
the 5 % level.
In order to address the concern that time varying characteristics of villages may be joint deter-
minants of groundwater water depth and selection into the public tube well program , I control for
a number of observed time varying demographic, economic, and geographical variables. In Column
(ii), I report the results that control for economic and demographic variables. The estimate of η,
which is the impact of public provision of groundwater on high cost villages relative to low cost
villages is unchanged from Column (i). Neither the point estimates for η, nor the signiﬁcance is
aﬀected by including these controls. In Column (iii), I further control for contemporaneous mean
annual rainfall level, its ﬁrst lag, and contemporaneous mean monthly temperature. The estimated
impact and signiﬁcance remain unchanged.
If the depth of the water table beyond which low cost surface pumps become infeasible is the
correct critical value dividing the villages into high and low costs, then on dividing the villages
in low and high costs using a depth smaller than this critical value, we should expect η to be
biased downwards. In other words, if ﬁxed cost really changes at 25 feet and the results are driven
by change in ﬁxed costs, then on dividing the villages using a depth below 25, one should see a
less signiﬁcant water saving eﬀect. In Figure 3, I show the results of such a placebo test. I use
various depths to the left and right of the breakpoint of 25 feet (approximately 8 meters) to divide
the villages into low and high cost categories. On moving from left to the depth of 25 feet, the
estimate of η is close to zero and statistically insigniﬁcant. At the critical value of 25 feet at which
surface pumps with suction technology become infeasible, the estimate of η jumps to -4.79 and
is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. When the same experiment is conducted to the
22Since we are measuring depth below ground level, negative coeﬃcient would mean that the eﬀect on water table
depth is positive as depth declines less in treated villages compared to comparison villages.
16right, the estimate seems stable up till the theoretical maximum of 34 feet (+9 feet from the cutoﬀ
point) although the signiﬁcance drops to the 10 percent level. As the placebo break point is moved
further, the diﬀerence becomes insigniﬁcant at conventional levels of signiﬁcance. This test lends
credibility to the identiﬁcation procedure.
7.2 Results on Number of Wells and Groundwater Irrigated Area
The model predicts that the public provision of groundwater crowds out investment in private wells
in high cost villages whereas, little or no change occurs in the low cost villages. Moreover, it is
the relatively large farmers who do not sink their own wells and begin using public water when
it becomes available. Because the price for groundwater that they face now is higher than under
private provision, they use less of it. If this is the case, then we should observe a decline in the
expansion of private wells in high cost villages after the program had been introduced. I formally
test these predictions stated above that the theoretical framework generates. First, I test whether
or not private investment in wells in high cost villages expanded less under public provision, and
little change occurred in low cost villages. Next, I examine whether it is the relatively larger farmers
who forego sinking a well when public water is available.
Table 2 reports the results for the average number of private wells. Column (i) of Panel A
shows that while there is no change in investment in private wells in low cost villages, public
provision leads to a relative decline in private wells in high cost villages. The expansion in the
number of private wells is 4.35 less in treated villages relative to comparison villages in the high
cost category. The diﬀerence between high cost and low cost categories is shown in Panel B. The
coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. On controlling for demographic and
economic covariates , the estimate of the diﬀerence in number of private wells between high cost
villages and low cost villages is unchanged (Panel B, Column (ii)). However, on controlling for
geographical covariates, the estimate is signiﬁcant at the 12 percent level. These results further
reinforce the crowding out hypothesis proposed in the theoretical framework.
The model suggests that relatively large farmers would forgo sinking their own wells when public
provision is available. The data classiﬁes the holding size of well owners into 4 categories : less
than 1 ha, between 1-2 ha, 2-10 ha and greater than 10 ha. The last category comprises all farmers
of holdings greater than 10 ha irrespective of scale. I compute a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimate
of the expansion in private wells 23 by holding size across both cost categories. Figure 4 shows the
23The number of cultivators in each of these holding size categories was imputed for the villages using block level
17estimate for each of the 4 land size categories. We observe that in low cost category, there is no
diﬀerence in the number of private wells between treated and comparison villages irrespective of
the scale. However, in high cost category, the larger farmers sink fewer wells. This evidence is also
consistent with the predictions of the model.
8 Selection
8.1 Selection into the Public Tube Well Program
The main objective of the public tube well program was to improve the standard of
living of resource poor farmers by aiding them in adopting irrigated farming. It was initiated in very
poor eastern districts of Uttar Pradesh that were almost contiguous. It is possible, however, that
the determinants of selection into the program were correlated with water table depth or factors
that aﬀect water table depth.
The main variables that determined selection into the program were ﬁxed characteristics of the
villages. For example, if villages had government canal irrigation available, then these did not make
compelling targets for the program as there was not enough un-irrigated area to make the program
cost eﬀective in such areas. As the tube wells had to be energized using an independent power line,
proximity to electric substations was important. If the area was ﬂood prone, it was not considered
for the public wells as in such areas, demand for water would be relatively low. In principal, there
could be other economic, demographic, and geological variables that were relevant in making the
selection decision. I therefore, explicitly model the probability of being selected into the program
as a function of a set of village time varying and time invariant characteristics. In particular, I
estimate a probit speciﬁcation and report the results in Table 3. Among the demographic and
economic controls, the only variable that signiﬁcantly aﬀects the probability of selection is the
number of households. Access to government canals, and tube well irrigation have a signiﬁcant
and negative eﬀect on being selected, although other forms of irrigation like tanks and rivers do
not matter. Geographical factors like rainfall, the lag of rainfall24 and temperature also have a
signiﬁcant eﬀect on the probability of selection. Other factors that inﬂuence water table depth like
elevation and slope do not eﬀect the selection probability. Finally, connection to the electricity
data from the Agricultural Census of Uttar Pradesh for 1995-96. I then computed percentage of cultivators who own
wells in each of the holding size categories. There is little evidence of change in land distribution over this period.
24 These results are unchanged if I include deviation of rainfall from long run average instead of the level.
18grid is an important positive determinant of selection. No measurements on water table depth are
available prior to 1990. In column (ii) , I include the water table depth from the time when the
wells were put into operation and the results indicate that this measure is not correlated with the
probability of selection into the program. In the regression analysis, I control for the demographic,
economic, and geographical variables that could change over time and across villages to ensure that
the results are not driven by trends in these variables. If the land distribution or the pattern of
crops diﬀer across the high and low cost villages, then the estimates will not be consistent. However,
a comparison of the village level imputed land distributions shows that these are not systematically
diﬀerent. The results are available on request. Also, there is no systematic diﬀerence in crop choice.
Availability of public wells could have induced migration from the villages that were not treated
into the treated villages.This would bias the results if land owning farmers move across villages.
However, this seems unlikely. First, land markets in rural Uttar Pradesh are thin at best. It is
highly unlikely for a farmer to sell his or her plot in one village and buy a parcel in another village
in response to these public wells. But land can be rented-in. Hence, I check migration patterns in
the World Bank Survey data 1997-98 Uttar Pradesh and Bihar Survey of Living Conditions which
is representative of this area. The most reported reason for out-migration is labor and more than
70 percent of those who migrate, move to another state. Among entrepreneurial work, weaving
and brick making are cited as types of work for which inhabitants of the villages migrate. No
out-migration is reported for farming. In light of this evidence, it seems unlikely that these public
wells caused land owning farmers to relocate to treated areas.
8.2 Heterogeneity in Selection
Since I want to estimate the heterogenous impact of the program on high ﬁxed cost relative to
low ﬁxed cost categories, I also estimate a probit model to determine the probability of selection
by cost category. I then check if the eﬀect of any co-variate on the likelihood of selection into the
program varies between low and high cost categories. Results are reported in Table 4. Column (i)
reports the results of a probit regression to determine probability of selection into the program for
the low cost villages. Column (ii) reports the results of a similar probit model but restricted to
high cost villages. The results from a Chow test for equivalence of the coeﬃcients across the two
probit models are reported in the last column along with the signiﬁcance level. The only variables
that seem to indicate a diﬀerential eﬀect on selection probability across two cost categories are
the percentage of literate population, and the number of primary schools. Lagged literacy data
19is unavailable and hence it cannot be ascertained if time trends in literacy diﬀerentially aﬀect
probability of selection across cost categories. However, I provide further evidence that percentage
of literate population does not aﬀect results. As a robustness check, I re-estimate equation (14)
including all covariates previously controlled for but excluding literate percentage. Results are
reported in Table 5, column (iv). Both the coeﬃcients and the standard errors are unchanged
compared to the benchmark results from Table 1, which are restated in columns (i)-(iii). In column
(v) and (vi), I re-estimate the benchmark model by ﬁrst controlling economic and demographic
covariates and then including additional geographical variables but now the sample is restricted to
villages with percentage literates more than the median in the benchmark sample. Results across
these sub-samples are not diﬀerent from the results obtained earlier (Columns (i),(ii) and (iii) ).
This result suggests that literacy is not driving the conclusions.
9 Caveats and Extensions
The paper demonstrates that the public tube well programmes initiated by the govern-
ment to mitigate poverty in fact result in sustainable use of groundwater. Sinking a well requires a
substantial investment. Two issues arise in this context. Market failure that results in the inability
of the smaller farmers to obtain credit to sink their well can be corrected by collective action. It
is possible that the farmers could co-operate and sink joint wells in order to share ﬁxed costs. In
such a case, public provision may not be necessary to facilitate adoption of groundwater irrigation.
For the data used in this study, less than .01 percent wells were jointly owned. Case studies have
demonstrated that such contracts suﬀer from hold-up problems ( Appudarai, 1986; Meinzen-Dick
and Sullins, 1994). In a recent study of joint ownership of wells, Aggarwal (2000) ﬁnds that the vil-
lagers did not co-operate in activities involving lumpy investments like maintenance, rehabilitating
of dry wells, or sinking new wells. Villagers perceived these to be very risky. On the other hand,
programs that facilitate subsidized credit for sinking wells may not lead to sustainable use. Foster
and Rosenzweig (2008) demonstrate that an increase in number of wells in the hands of smaller
farmers leads to increased groundwater usage.
It is also possible for private markets for water to arise. The model used here does not address
that possibility explicitly. Most of the existing literature on markets for water points out that these
are bilateral trade arrangements among neighbors (Jacoby et al., 2004; Foster and Sekhri, 2007).
In such a case, a group of buyers and seller can be thought of as one large farmer. This would
20only result in a shift of the perceived land distribution for the purposes of the model. The amount
of water that can be extracted from a well depends on its depth and other investment in well
technology. To the extent that the intermediate farmers are constrained in deepening their wells
freely, the model captures functioning markets. For large farmers to operate in a more integrated
market, an extensive distribution network would be needed which is not only very expensive to
lay out but also infeasible on account of property rights issues as the channels would have to pass
through privately owned land. A number of case studies point that such permissions in case of
unlined ﬁeld channels result in conﬂict.
The analysis here implies that these schemes increase eﬃciency of groundwater use. A realloca-
tion of water from a larger farm with lower marginal product for water to a smaller farm with higher
marginal product would increase eﬃciency. Distributional consequences have not been explicitly
studied in the paper because of the constraints of the data. The analytical framework does gen-
erate testable implications about the distributional impact of this scheme. Under the assumption
that returns from groundwater irrigation are positive, the smaller farmers would be better oﬀ from
adopting irrigation. The intermediate farmers use less water and their yields may decline but the
overall proﬁtability increases. The paper suggests that the schemes are welfare enhancing. The
eﬀect on total agricultural output would depend on whether the increase in output from smaller
farms oﬀsets the decrease in output from larger farms. A large body of research has demonstrated
that the per unit yield of smaller farms is greater than the larger farms. Disaggregated agricultural
data at the level of farmers in villages is unavailable. Exploratory analysis of the aggregated data
suggests that agricultural output does not fall in blocks with program villages. An important avenue
of future research would be to analyze the welfare and productivity impact of such programs.
This paper abstracts from addressing externalities arising from well interference. When several
pumps irrigate in the vicinity of each other, the extraction from one well aﬀects the extraction of
other wells due to underlying hydrological features of the aquifer. The proposed mechanism in the
paper establishes that the number of private wells in the high cost areas that received public wells
expanded less than in comparison villages. Under this scenario, fewer wells are pumping in the
vicinity of each other. The immediate aﬀect of this is a reduction in water usage as the rate of ﬂow
of water moving towards fewer wells is smaller. This paper cannot quantify this eﬀect. But the
magnitude of this eﬀect may not be large if the well reduction occurs in a dispersed rather than
spatially concentrated manner in the village.
Under the general conditions of thick tailed land distribution, and aquifers where water tables
21are not so deep that the cost to access them are prohibitive for private irrigators, the results of
this paper generalize to any aquifer. The results suggest that a price can be charged such that it
leads to sustainable use of water. In that sense, the results are externally valid. However, in order
to address the normative question of what price should be charged that would lead to sustainable
adoption of groundwater irrigation, aquifer level characteristics would have to be considered and
price would be sensitive to these conditions.
10 Conclusion
This paper demonstrates that public provision of groundwater through large capacity
wells can lead to overall savings in groundwater use in areas where ﬁxed costs for accessing the
aquifers are high. The conceptual framework hypothesized that when ﬁxed costs are high, public
provision crowds out private provision of wells and net use of water can decline. Using a triple
diﬀerence approach in which I compare villages that received public tube wells to similar villages
that did not receive public tube wells over time and across high and low ﬁxed cost categories, I ﬁnd
consistent evidence that shows that when ﬁxed costs are high, public provision beneﬁts the aquifers
over the range of depths observed in the data. Using the same method, I ﬁnd further supporting
evidence that shows that in fact the water conservation is a result of crowding out of private wells
and an overall reduction in the share of irrigated area.
The division of villages across high and low ﬁxed cost categories is based on the physical
limitations of relatively inexpensive surface pumps. These pumps cannot be used for a vertical lift
of water beyond a critical value. As a result, the cost of accessing water goes up at a particular
depth. The villages were not randomly assigned to the program but robustness checks indicate
that the results are not biased due to selection. Moreover, villages were not diﬀerentially selected
across cost categories.
From a policy perspective, the results suggest that the goal of increasing access to ground-
water in a sustainable manner can be furthered using well designed public provision schemes.
This paper also suggests that providing irrigation infrastructure can have progressive distributional
consequences and that achieving distributional objectives can be complementary with achieving
environmental objectives.
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25Mathematical Appendix
Proof of Proposition I :





























⇒ 4W = 0
Case (2): a∗











































































1−µ which is always positive
Hence, 4W < 0
Note: at µ = 1 , The function does not exist.

























































































































































































































































































































































































Diﬀerential water usage becomes positive when d > d∗




































Then this is written as
µ > 1 − ρ (6)
So, if (6) holds then the total diﬀerential water usage will become positive at d* ,while there will be
net water savings for depth d < d∗
(Note :The function 4W is continuous and the limd→∞ 4W > 0 for µ > 1 so that d* is unique.)
However, if µ < 1 − ρ, then 4W is always negative
28Data Appendix
Variable Definition Source
 Average Ground Water  Depth in meters below ground level at  Minor Irrigation Census,
 Level for the Village which water is found  1993 and 2000
 Average Number of  Average number of shallow tube wells  Minor Irrigation Census,
 Private wells owned by farmers  1993 and 2000
 Ground Water Irrigated Ratio of area irrigated by ground water  Minor Irrigation Census,
 Area to the total sown area 1993 and 2000
 Total Population Total Population of the village  Census of India,   
1991 and 2001
Primary Census Abstract
 Number of Households Number of residing households in the  Census of India,   
village 1991 and 2001
Primary Census Abstract
 Percentage Workers Main workers as percentage of   Census of India,   
total population in the village 1991 and 2001
Primary Census Abstract
 Percentage Scheduled  Percentage of total population that is  Census of India,   
 Caste classified as scheduled caste 1991 and 2001
Primary Census Abstract
 Percentage Literate Percentage of the Population that is  Census of India,   
literate 1991 and 2001
Primary Census Abstract
 Density Total Population over the total area of  Census of India,   
the village 1991 and 2001
Primary Census Abstract
 Power Dummy variable=1 if the village is  Census of India, 1991
electrified, and  0 otherwise Village Directory
 Primary Dummy variable=1 if the village has a Census of India,1991
primary school, and 0 otherwise Village Directory
 Community Health  Dummy variable=1 if the village has  Census of India,1991
 Workers Community health workers, and 0 otherwise Village Directory
 Government Canal  Dummy variable =1 if the village has  Census of India,1991
Government canal irrigation, and 0 otherwise Village Directory
(cont.) Tubewell  Dummy variable=1 if the village has  Census of India,1991
tube well irrigation, and 0 otherwise Village Directory
 Tank Dummy variable=1 if the village has  Census of India,1991
tank irrigation, and 0 otherwise Village Directory
 River Dummy variable=1 if the village has  Census of India,1991
river irrigation, and 0 otherwise Village Directory
 Elevation Elevation of the village above sea level Digital Elevation Model,
in meters SRTM 1km (India)
 Slope  Slope of the village terrain Digital Elevation Model,
SRTM 1 km  (India)
 Rainfall Average Annual Rainfall in mm  UEA CRU TS2p1 monthly 
prcp
 Temperature Mean monthly temperature UEA CRU TS2p1 monthly
mean
 Number of Holdings Number of Holdings of various sizes in Agricultural Census of 
           ( < 1  ha) administrative blocks of the program  Uttar Pradesh,
           (1-2   ha) districts 1995-96
          ( 2-10 ha)
          ( >10  ha)
Working  Sample (common support of baseline groundwater depth)
1) There are three observations for treated villages for which there are no comparable comparison
villages  in terms of water table depth at the time when the public tube wells were put into operation. 
These are in the extreme right tail of the baseline depth distribution. Also, there are 43 
comparison villages for which there are no comparable treated observations.
I exclude these observations in the regressions to detect heregenous impact following Heckman et al.
1996 and Heckman et al. 1997. These observations are 0.6 percent of the total.
2) In the regressions controlling for covariates, 93.2 percent of the sample is retained as around 
 6.8 percent of the observations did not match across various data sources.Table A1: Descriptive Statistics
Period 1 Period2
Mean Std Dev. Mean Std. Dev
A. Outcome Variables
Village Average  Depth of Groundwater 7.59 9.53 9.64 31
Ratio of Groundwater Irrigated to Sown Area 0.36 1.29 0.55 0.34
Ground Water Irrigated Area 42.85 75.34 75 82.17
Sown Area 147.71 216.7 155 134.03
Number of Shallow Tubewells 19.95 26.81 42.89 42.18
B. Demographic and Economic Variables
Total Population 1138.94 1111.34 1437.34 1379.36
Number of Households 187.15 182.79 222.57 211.6
Percentage Scheduled Caste Population 0.2 0.16 0.21 0.163
Percentage Literate Population 02 6 01 2 03 9 01 3 Percentage Literate Population 0.26 0.12 0.39 0.13
Percentage Working Population 0.305 0.09 0.356 0.12
Density of Population 7.3 7.78 9.36 10.12
C. Geographical Variables
Average Annual Rainfall 81.55 18.65 65.24 14.75

























































































































































































Public Tube Well * Post  ‐0.15 ‐0.2 ‐0.16
*Low Cost (1.2) (1.20) (1.2)
 Public Tube Well * Post  ‐5.15 ‐5.18 ‐5.28
*High Cost (2.25) (2.25) (2.23)
Demographic and Economic time varying controls No Yes Yes
Geographical time varying controls No No Yes Geographical  time varying controls No No Yes
Observations 14204 14204 14204




Difference Between Point estimates  ‐5 ‐4.98 ‐5.12
from Panel A
F statistic (testing if the difference is 0) 3.85 3.78 3.97












Public Tube Well * Post  ‐0.28 ‐1.48 ‐0.81
*Low Cost (1.2) (1.15) (1.15)
 Public Tube Well * Post  ‐4.35 ‐5.5 ‐3.8
*High Cost (1.6) (1.54) (1.55)
Demographic and Economic time varying controls No Yes Yes
Geographical time varying controls No No Yes
Observations 14295 14295 14295




Difference ‐4.07 ‐4.02 ‐2.99
F statistic 4.14 4.32 2.43










coeff std err coeff std err
Economic  & Demographic  Variables
Workers ‐0.101 0.2921 ‐0.1007 0.292145
Schedule Caste 0.17597 0.1428 0.17598 0.142844
Literate 0.3651 0.2229 0.36615 0.223111
Density of Population ‐0.0045 0.0028 ‐0.0045 0.002774
Number of Households 0.00071 0.0001 0.00071 0.000117
Infrastructure
 Power (=1 if electrified) 0.4469 0.0759 0.44696 0.075868
Community Health Workers (=1 if engaged) ‐0.1187 0.0479 ‐0.1186 0.047871
Primary School (=1 if has one) 0.29531 0.0533 0.29532 0.053252
Irrigation
(variable =1 if any land irrigated by source)
Tubewell  ‐0.1217 0.048 ‐0.1218 0.048008
Government Canals  ‐0.5038 0.0568 ‐0.504 0.056795
Tanks 0.09587 0.0925 0.09596 0.092557
Rivers 0.04264 0.2526 0.04221 0.252619
Geology & Geography
Rainfall in selection year ‐0.0195 0.0024 ‐0.0195 0.00237
Lag 1 of rainfall 0.01156 0.0024 0.01157 0.002393
temperature ‐0.5297 0.1511 ‐0.5296 0.151087
elevation 0.00279 0.0036 0.00279 0.003644






(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
coefficient std err coefficient std err Statistic Significance
Economic  & Demographic  Variables
Fraction of Village Population
Workers 0.0719111 0.321 ‐0.751853 0.768 1.1 0.297
Schedule Caste 0.2187286 0.158 ‐0.084597 0.355 0.68 0.408
Literate 0.0175341 0.25 1.908248 0.534 11.68 0.0006
Density of Population ‐0.003117 0.003 ‐0.013018 0.007 1.6 0.206
Number of Households 0.0008208 1E‐04 0.0003554 2E‐04 2.84 0.09
Infrastructure
 Power (=1 if electrified) 0.4690655 0.084 0.3190244 0.192 0.51 0.47
Community Health Workers (=1 if engaged) ‐0.095227 0.053 ‐0.253187 0.114 1.47 0.224
Primary School (=1 if has one) 0.2474967 0.059 0.5476381 0.131 4.42 0.035
Irrigation
(variable =1 if any land irrigated by source)
Tubewell ‐ 0.106351 0.053 ‐0.197477 0.116 0.53 0.465
Government Canals ‐ 0.51185 0.062 ‐0.532467 0.154 0.02 0.897
Tanks 0.0747679 0.099 0.1642316 0.294 0.09 0.769
Rivers ‐0.07617 0.275 0.8409716 0.738 2.2 0.137
Geology & Geography
Rainfall in selection year ‐0.019613 0.003 ‐0.026985 0.007 1.35 0.245
Lag 1 of rainfall 0.0113887 0.003 0.0202163 0.007 1.93 0.164
temperature ‐0.468975 0.163 ‐0.732807 0.429 0.41 0.524
elevation 0.002003 0.004 0.0126146 0.01 1.09 0.297










(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
 Public Tube Well * Post ‐ 0.15 ‐0.23 ‐0.16 ‐0.15 ‐0.58 ‐0.72
*Low Cost (1.2) (1.20) (1.2) (1.18) (1.15) (1.12)
Public Tube Well * Post ‐ 5.15 ‐5.17 ‐5.28 ‐5.28 ‐6.43 ‐6.65
* High Cost (2.25) (2.25) (2.28) (2.28) (2.58) (2.65)
Demographic and Economic time varying controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical time varying controls No No Yes Yes No Yes
Observations 14204 14204 14204 14204 7206 7206
R‐Squared 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.19
  Panel B: Heterogeneity in Impact of  Public Tube Well Program  between High and Low Cost Categories
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Difference Between Point estimates ‐ 5 ‐4.94 ‐5.12 ‐5.13 ‐5.85 ‐5.93
from Panel A
F statistic (testing if the difference is 0) 3.85 3.7 3.91 4 4.26 4.3
Significance level 0.049 0.054 0.048 0.045 0.039 0.038
Notes:
Std errors are reported in parantheses and are clustered at village level. All regressios in Panel A are  based on the baseline groundwater depth common support
 sample matched to various other data sources as described in Data Appendix.  Columns (i) ‐ (iii) show the results reported in Table 1. Column (iv) reports the
 results of a regression where fraction of literate population is not controlled. Columns (v) and (vi) report results from regressions where the  working sample is
restricted to villages with fraction of literates > median of the full sample.  Low cost category  is charaterized by the depth below ground level  upto which low cost
 surface pumps are physically feasible. Demographic and economic controls include number of households, fraction of scheduled caste population, fraction of 
literate population, and fraction of workers in the population. Geographical  variables include rainfall ,first lag of rainfall, and average monthly  temperature.